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Article 7

Biography Is Destiny: The Case of
Justice Peter V. Daniel
Earl M. Maltz †
Judicial biographies are an indispensable resource for
those of us seeking to understand the structure of
constitutional law.
The evolution of this structure is
determined by the interacting views of the shifting groups of
nine individuals serving on the Court over time.
Each
individual’s position reflects a unique set of influences and
experiences. Judicial biographies provide detailed accounts of
these influences and experiences, thereby deepening our
knowledge of the forces that ultimately shape Supreme Court
jurisprudence.
By contrast, more traditional modes of constitutional
scholarship tend to focus only on certain parts of the Justices’
biographies to the exclusion of other significant influences on
the development of their views. For example, purely doctrinal
descriptions of Supreme Court opinions implicitly reflect the
understanding that all of the Justices have graduated from law
school and, as such, have internalized and are to a greater or
lesser degree influenced by the distinctive conventions of legal
analysis that are at the core of the law school curriculum.
Other analyses emphasize the political backgrounds and views
of the Justices as the primary determinants of judicial
decisionmaking—once again, emphasizing only one part of the
Justices’ biographies.
However, judicial decisions are often influenced by
aspects of the Justices’ lives that are not easily assimilated into
either doctrinal or political analysis. Justice Lewis F. Powell,
Jr.’s approach to privacy issues provides an example of such
influences. Powell’s approach to Roe v. Wade 1 and its progeny
was no doubt affected by his experience counseling a distraught
†
Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden). The text of this article
will be incorporated into EARL M. MALTZ, DRED SCOTT AND THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY
(University Press of Kansas, forthcoming).
1
410 U.S. 113 (1973).

199

200

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1

young man who came to him for advice regarding an
unplanned pregnancy at a time when abortion was illegal in
Virginia. 2 Conversely, Powell’s 1986 decision to provide the
crucial fifth vote rejecting a challenge to a Texas anti-sodomy
statute in Bowers v. Hardwick 3 was likely influenced by his
stated belief that he had never met a gay person—an assertion
that, ironically, Powell made at a time when he employed a gay
law clerk. 4
Analogous factors can play a role even in the most
unlikely of circumstances. Consider the case of Justice Peter
V. Daniel of Virginia. Although Daniel is the subject of a very
fine biography by John P. Frank, 5 those who are not deeply
immersed in the constitutional law of slavery may never have
even heard of him. In the literature on Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 6 he is typically dismissed as an almost cartoonish
character, the very embodiment of Southern extremism.
Daniel is variously described as “a brooding proslavery
fanatic,” 7 a “bigot” with a “fanatical temper,” 8 and a “zealot who
hoped that his fellow southerners would go to ‘any extremity’ to
ensure that slave property received greater protection than any
other form of property.” 9 In some respects, by 1857, these
characterizations were quite accurate. Closer examination,
however, reveals that the forces that shaped Daniel’s views in
Dred Scott were quite complex.
Peter Vivian Daniel was born on April 24, 1784, on a
family farm in Stafford County, Virginia, an agricultural region
located approximately fifty miles south of Washington, D.C.
and sixty miles north of Richmond. 10 He received his early
education from private tutors, and in 1802, spent a few months
at Princeton before returning to Stafford County. In 1805,
Daniel moved to Richmond to study law in the offices of
Edmund Randolph.
Randolph, a former aide to George
2
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Washington, had served as both Attorney General and
Governor of Virginia. In addition, he had represented Virginia
in the Continental Congress and the Constitutional
Convention. After being admitted to the bar in 1808, Daniel
came back to Stafford County to practice. In 1809, he returned
to Richmond as a representative to the state legislature, and in
1810, married Randolph’s younger daughter, Lucy. Thereafter
Daniel permanently relocated to Richmond.
The Randolph connection did not translate into great
financial prosperity for the Daniel family. Daniel was a
committed Jeffersonian in a city whose business establishment
was dominated by Federalists and later Whigs, men who
tended to give their business to those who shared their political
views. Thus, throughout his life, Daniel’s income was far less
than that of the exalted company in which he found himself.
However, the son-in-law and protégé of Edmund
Randolph did have immediate access to the highest circles in
Virginia Democratic politics. He quickly became a prominent
member of the so-called “Richmond Junto,” a network of
influential Democrats that dominated Virginia politics for
much of the early nineteenth century. Daniel’s formal base of
power was his membership on the Virginia Council of State, a
unique institution which shared executive power with the state
governor. Daniel served on the Council almost continuously
from 1812 to 1835, and for much of that period was its senior
member and, as such, Lieutenant Governor of the state.
Beginning in the 1820s, Daniel also started taking an
increasingly active role in national politics. In 1824, the Junto
threw its support behind presidential candidate William H.
Crawford of Georgia. The election was ultimately decided by
the House of Representatives, with John Quincy Adams
defeating both Crawford and Andrew Jackson. In 1828, Daniel
vigorously supported the ticket of Jackson and John C.
Calhoun of South Carolina, and was rewarded as the JacksonCalhoun forces carried Virginia and thwarted Adams’ bid for
reelection.
Daniel had great admiration for Jackson; however, he
had a much closer personal relationship with Jackson’s trusted
lieutenant Martin Van Buren, the New York politician largely
responsible for reinvigorating the Democratic Party in the late
1820s. In the early 1820s, Van Buren had established a
political alliance between his Albany Regency and the
Richmond Junto. For more than two decades thereafter,
Daniel maintained an active correspondence with the “Little
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Magician,” strongly supporting his campaigns for the vice
presidency in 1832 and the presidency in 1836.
This personal relationship no doubt influenced Daniel’s
thinking when Virginia Democrats split between supporters of
Jackson and Calhoun during Jackson’s first term. The key
issue dividing the two factions was the protective tariff which
had been adopted with Jackson’s support. Daniel agreed with
Calhoun on the substantive issue; nonetheless, he remained
the titular leader of the Jackson Democrats in Virginia.
Moreover, despite his lifelong commitment to states’ rights,
Daniel continued to support the administration in its firm
opposition to South Carolina’s claim that it had the right to
nullify the tariff on constitutional grounds. At the same time,
Daniel also consistently adhered to the view that a state had
the right to secede from the Union in response to more severe
provocation.
Daniel’s position on the tariff itself must have left him
somewhat ambivalent in his support for Jackson against
Calhoun and the State of South Carolina. However, he had no
compunctions about rallying behind the administration in its
war with the Bank of the United States. Daniel considered the
Bank an abomination. When asked to evaluate the claims of
an aspirant to political office, Daniel replied, “He has professed
a belief in the constitutionality of a national bank, and that is
an objection which with me would overrule any and every
recommendation which could be urged for him or for any other
person.” 11 Thus, Daniel enthusiastically supported Jackson’s
decision to remove federal deposits and place them in state
banks. When Roger Brooke Taney left his position as Attorney
General to oversee this process as Secretary of the Treasury,
Jackson chose Daniel to be Taney’s replacement. Daniel
refused this appointment for financial reasons. However, in
March, 1836, when Philip P. Barbour left the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to become an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Daniel accepted an
appointment to be his successor.
Five years later, on February 25, 1841, Justice Barbour
died in office. Martin Van Buren, who succeeded Jackson in
1836 but was defeated for reelection by Whig William Henry
Harrison in 1840, had eight days left until his term expired.
Seeking to deprive the Whigs of the opportunity to choose a
11

Id. at 113 (quoting Justice Daniel).
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Justice, Van Buren quickly appointed Daniel to succeed
Barbour on the Court.
A brief but intense political struggle over the
nomination soon followed. The dispute over slavery that would
soon become so prominent played no role in this struggle;
instead, the dispute was simply an incident in the ongoing
battle for political power between the Democrats and the
Whigs.
Democrats in the Senate had enough votes for
confirmation. Whigs, however, knew that if they could delay
Senate action for just eight days, the nomination would
automatically die and the seat would be filled by a Harrison
nominee.
Daniel’s opponents pursued a two-pronged strategy in
seeking to achieve this objective. 12 They first sought to take
advantage of the fact that recently admitted southwestern
states were not yet part of any circuit and had no
representation on the Supreme Court. The Whigs introduced a
bill that would have remedied this situation by abolishing the
existing Fourth Circuit, merging Virginia and North Carolina
into other existing circuits, and creating a new southwestern
circuit in place of the Fourth. They hoped thereby to entice
some southwestern Democrats to oppose Daniel in the hope of
having a Justice appointed from their own region to service the
new circuit.
This part of the strategy was a partial success. The
circuit reorganization bill passed the Senate, and some
southwestern Democrats abandoned the Daniel nomination.
Nonetheless, after it became apparent that the Senate bill
could not be acted upon in the House of Representatives, it also
became clear that Daniel retained enough support to be
confirmed if the matter came to a vote on the merits.
In their second attempt to defeat Daniel’s nomination,
the Whigs tried to deprive the Senate of a quorum by
abandoning the chamber en masse. This attempt failed by the
narrowest of margins after the Democratic leadership scoured
the city of Washington in a desperate effort to locate absent
Democratic senators. Thus, shortly after midnight on March 2,
1841, Peter V. Daniel was confirmed as an Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court.
Van Buren reported to Jackson that, in nominating
Daniel, he had taken the opportunity “to put a man on the
12

Id. at 155-60 (describing the struggle over Daniel’s confirmation).
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bench of the Supreme Court . . . who will I am sure stick to the
true principles of the constitution, and being a Democrat ab ovo
[literally, from the egg] is not in so much danger of a falling off
in the true spirit.” 13 In many respects, the tall, spare, darkcomplected Daniel met or even exceeded Van Buren’s
expectations. A true agrarian conservative, Daniel was deeply
committed to the constitutional theories embodied in the
Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions and the work of John
Taylor. He viewed the defense of these principles against the
Whigs’ nationalist, pro-business policies as an apocalyptic
struggle between good and evil. Daniel’s public comments on
politics were notable for their forcefulness; he was described by
one political opponent as “one of the most violent partisan
writers in the state.” 14 Daniel was no less emphatic in private.
In an 1832 letter to Van Buren, he described the forthcoming
election as a “great struggle between democracy and the
constitution on the one hand, and corruption and profligacy
unexampled on the other.” 15 He declared, “The conflict we are
now waging [is] against that worst of all influences; that which
puts intelligence, probity, patriotism, falsehood, venality, vice
in every form, all upon an equality, that is, values them merely
as they can become means to be wielded to its purposes—the
influence of money.” 16 Similarly, after meeting Daniel Webster,
Daniel reported, “My hand was actually contaminated by
contact with his.” 17 In short, as John P. Frank has aptly
observed, “[T]he Daniel who came to the Court in 1841 . . . was
a man of controversy, ferocious, unyielding, and utterly
humorless in dispute.” 18
These attitudes and personal characteristics shaped
Daniel’s treatment of the constitutional issues that came before
the Taney Court. Not surprisingly, the Chief Justice was
Daniel’s closest friend and ideological ally on the Court;
however, Daniel was considerably less compromising than
Taney in his position on issues such as federalism and the
rights of corporations. He dissented alone more than twice as
often as any other Justice during his tenure, and more than

13
14
15
16
17
18

Id. at 160-61 (quoting Martin Van Buren).
Id. at 88.
Id. at 87 (quoting Justice Daniel).
FRANK, supra note 5, at 87 (quoting Justice Daniel).
Id. at 88 (quoting Justice Daniel).
Id. at 166.
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three times as often as Taney, John Catron, and John A.
Campbell combined. 19
One of the most notable features of Daniel’s
jurisprudence was his opposition to the expansion of federal
power. On a variety of issues ranging from the interpretation
of the commerce power to questions of federal jurisdiction,
Daniel consistently argued that the authority of the federal
government should be circumscribed within narrow limits. 20
However, he was apparently willing to subordinate this
principle to the need to protect Southern interests. For
example, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 21 Daniel concurred in the
view that Congress did not exceed its authority in passing the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.
On the issue of federal exclusivity, however, Daniel’s
position was far more consistent with the overall pattern of his
jurisprudence. Throughout the 1840s, he joined Taney and
Samuel Nelson in strenuously arguing that, in the absence of
contrary federal legislation, the Commerce Clause by its terms
did not divest the states of the power to regulate or tax
interstate commerce. These Justices were, however, unable to
attract majority support for a single opinion embodying this
view. Thus, in 1851, both Taney and Nelson agreed to join a
compromise majority opinion in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 22
which proclaimed that federal power over matters of national
concern was exclusive, but that the states retained concurrent
authority to regulate interstate commerce in situations where
local interest predominated. Among the previous advocates of
nonexclusivity, Daniel stood alone in rejecting the compromise.
Displaying what might be described as either an admirable
devotion to principle or simple blind stubbornness, he
continued to insist that only congressional action could deprive
the states of their inherent authority to regulate commerce. 23
This theme of concurrent state and federal jurisdiction
also dominated Daniel’s opinion in Prigg. 24 The basic theme of
his opinion is that, while Congress possessed authority to
implement the Fugitive Slave Clause, states also retained
19

Id. at 237.
E.g., The Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 46365 (1851) (Daniel, J., dissenting); Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 180-81
(1845) (Daniel, J., dissenting).
21
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 650-57 (1842) (Daniel, J., concurring).
22
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
23
Id. at 325-26 (Daniel, J., concurring).
24
41 U.S. at 650-57 (Daniel, J., concurring).
20
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power to pass laws that would provide further aid to the
slaveowner. Most of Daniel’s opinion is devoted to a systematic
canvass of authorities that, he contended, supported the theory
of concurrent power in general terms. Daniel also emphasized
the symbolic effect of a holding of federal exclusivity in the
specific context of the Fugitive Slave Clause:
[S]uppose that a fugitive from service should have fled to a state
where slavery does not exist, and in which the prevalent feeling is
hostile to that institution; there might, nevertheless, in such a
community, be a disposition to yield something to an acknowledged
constitutional right—something to national comity too, in the
preservation of that right; but let it once be proclaimed from this
tribunal, that any concession by the states towards the maintenance
of such a right, is a positive offence, the violation of a solemn duty,
and I ask what pretext more plausible could be offered to those who
are disposed to protect the fugitive, or to defeat the rights of the
master? The Constitution and the act of Congress would thus be
converted into instruments for the destruction of that which they
were designed especially to protect. 25

Finally, Daniel rejected the argument that states might, under
the guise of legislation purportedly designed to protect the
rights of slaveowners, actually impede the recovery of fugitives.
He observed that analogous arguments might be made against
the grant of enforcement power to the federal government, and
that “should . . . abuses be attempted, the corrective may be
found . . . in the controlling constitutional authority of this
Court.” 26
Daniel argued that states not only possessed the power
to pass supplementary legislation, but that such legislation
was, in fact, desirable. Seemingly accepting Justice Story’s
conclusion that state officials could not be compelled to
participate in the enforcement of the federal statute, Daniel
observed that federal law enforcement officials were far less
numerous than their state counterparts, and that state
legislation might therefore be necessary to provide the
slaveholder with any effective governmental assistance. 27
Obviously, Daniel’s opinion in Prigg reflects the views of
a Southerner committed to the defense of slavery. His
concurrence was clearly influenced by both ordinary political
considerations and distinctively legal analysis.
Daniel’s

25
26
27

Id. at 657.
Id.
Id. at 656-57.
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endorsement of Story’s view that Congress had power to
legislate in support of slaveowners’ rights was in some tension
with Daniel’s position as the Taney era’s foremost advocate of
limited federal power. However, his advocacy of the concurrent
power doctrine was no more than a simple application of the
principles that Daniel espoused in other contexts. In short,
while clearly adopting a position that was more proslavery
than that of Justice Story, Daniel’s opinion was no more
intemperate in substance and tone than the analogous
antislavery opinion of Justice McLean.
Yet despite his unyielding commitment to the defense of
slavery, prior to 1847, Daniel would have been an unlikely
candidate to produce the kind of inflammatory opinion that he
produced in Dred Scott. Daniel’s political alliance with Martin
Van Buren was a model of bisectional cooperation, and his
opinion in Prigg, while undoubtedly pro-Southern, was
moderate in tone. Moreover, Daniel was one of the few
Southerners who opposed the movement to annex Texas,
viewing it as a Calhounite conspiracy.
At the same time, however, Daniel took offense to
Northerners who opposed annexation because the addition of
Texas would benefit the slave state. In 1844, he expressed this
outrage to Van Buren in the strongest terms:
Can anything be more galling to the spirit of honorable men than to
be told that it is enough to justify the condemnation of any measure,
that its effect may be the promotion of their peculiar interests and
welfare: that it may prove advantageous to the holders of slave
property? Are we to be placed under permanent and unrelenting
ban of the Federal Government? To be held as less than the equals
of our miscalled fellow citizens? To be regarded as the plague-spot
upon our nation, and then required by our oppressors and revilers to
shout for our blessed Union? A blessed Union indeed it would be
upon such terms. No—No—The most temperate amongst us, would
not hesitate to decide, if things have come or are to come to this
complexion, to go with our imputed blemishes, our crimes and
defilements, apart to ourselves; and leave these exclusively beautiful
and moral and clean and immaculate, to their own purity. 28

The dispute over the Wilmot Proviso crystallized
Daniel’s outrage. As early as 1845, Daniel privately expressed
the view that federal legislation explicitly limiting the right of
slaveowners to bring slaves into the territories would be
grounds for secession.
Nonetheless, he expressed his
28
5 CARL B. SWISHER, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: THE TANEY PERIOD 1836-64, at 560-61 (quoting Justice Daniel).
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willingness to accept the general idea of geographical division
as a workable compromise. Two years later, the New York
State Democratic Convention adopted a resolution supporting
the position that slavery should be outlawed in all of the
territory obtained from Mexico. Daniel wrote to Van Buren
seeking clarification of his position on this issue. When Van
Buren replied evasively, Daniel (whose wife had recently died
from a stroke) responded that if Van Buren in fact supported
the Wilmot Proviso,
I shall have lived to witness a development, that even the great
overwhelming and stunning personal calamity which has come upon
me cannot prevent me from contemplating with deep sorrow and
alarm. I shall have been constrained to perceive on the part of those,
on whom of all the public men in this nation I imposed the greatest
trust, what my deliberate convictions compel me to view as the
overthrow of the great national compact; as the extreme of injury
and oppression; oppression in its most galling form, because it
declares to me that I am not regarded as an equal. 29

Daniel’s mortification could only have been magnified in 1848,
when Van Buren became the presidential candidate of the Free
Soil Party.
The impact of Daniel’s sense of personal betrayal on the
subsequent evolution of his political thought cannot be reliably
assessed. What is clear is that beginning in the late 1840s,
Daniel associated all things Northern with the antislavery
movement, and hated the North with an obsessive fury that he
had hitherto reserved for his Whig political enemies. He
refused to venture north of the Delaware River and became
indifferent to the preservation of the Union itself. When
Daniel’s great-nephew made a favorable comment regarding
those who took antislavery positions, Daniel replied simply, “I
fear those people are very wicked.” 30
The language of Daniel’s concurring opinion in Dred
Scott reveals the depth of his bitterness over what he saw as
betrayal by his one-time friend and ally. Based upon what he
believed were “truths which a knowledge of the history of the
world, and particularly of that of our own country, compels us
to know,” 31 Daniel contended that:

29
30
31

Frank, supra note 5, at 245-46 (quoting Justice Daniel).
5 SWISHER, supra note 28, at 70 (quoting Justice Daniel).
Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 475 (Daniel, J., concurring).

2006]

BIOGRAPHY IS DESTINY

209

[T]he African negro race never have been acknowledged as belonging
to the family of nations; that as amongst them there never has been
known or recognised by the inhabitants of other countries anything
partaking of the character of nationality, or civil or political polity;
that this race has been by all the nations of Europe regarded as
subjects of capture or purchase; as subjects of commerce or traffic;
and that the introduction of that race into every section of this
country was not as members of civil or political society, but as slaves,
as property in the strictest sense of the term. 32

Later, addressing the claim that Congress could
constitutionally bar slavery from the territories, Daniel argued:
Can there be imputed to the sages and patriots by whom the
Constitution was framed, or can there be detected in the text of that
Constitution, or in any rational construction or implication deducible
therefrom, a contradiction so palpable as would exist between a
pledge to the slaveholder of an equality with his fellow-citizens,
and . . . a warrant given . . . to another, to rob him of that property,
or to subject him to proscription and disfranchisement for possessing
or for endeavoring to retain it? The injustice and extravagance
necessarily implied in a supposition like this, cannot be rationally
imputed to the patriotic or the honest, or to those who were merely
sane. 33

Of course, even if he had never broken with Van Buren, Daniel
might well have reached the same conclusions in Dred Scott
(although he probably would have expressed his views in more
temperate language). Nonetheless, the basic point remains.
The views of judges are not shaped only by legal theory and
political ideology, but by the totality of their life experiences.
Thus, the work of biographers such as John P. Frank, Linda
Greenhouse, 34 and Dennis Hutchinson 35 is indispensable to
those who hope to truly understand the judicial process.
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